

The on-site inspection revealed that the isolator of the bus coupler had closed only two contacts. The task was to verify that the interruption of a single pole could cause an overcurrent trip of the feeding transformer. This was achieved in a first step by analyzing the situation in symmetrical components.




Figure 2: Phase and earth currents for single pole interruption

By modeling the system afterwards in a software tool, it was possible to show that in networks with resonant earthing / grounding, single phase interruptions can lead to over-currents and even overvoltages. The result of the analysis was the basis to propose improved protection settings to eliminate such failures in future.

Start-up failure of a power station

The trip of a low voltage drive resulted in an unsuccessful start-up process of a power station. Measurements showed a high level of voltage distortion under start-up conditions of the 6kV auxiliary bus. The distortion originated from the generator's start-up converter.

The simulation of the configuration with instantaneous values in PSS[®]-NETOMAC resulted in similar diagrams as shown in the measurements of the disturbance. This underlines the high quality of the model for the converter drive. The simulation was then used to investigate mitigation options.

In addition to the well known, but expensive solutions such as filter circuits, it was possible to present an efficient, site specific solution. The installation of a series reactor resulted in reliable start-up in both the simulation and the real power plant.




Figure 3: Simulated and measured voltage

Blackout of an industrial complex

A trip signal of a bus bar differential protection caused a costly blackout of a liquid natural gas (LNG) plant, as all busses of a double bus bar system were affected.

The analysis on-site revealed that the switchgear was composed of two sections from different vendors and the protection concept was a third party engineering work.

By analyzing the fault records and local measurements, it was possible to reveal that the delay time of a single auxiliary contact started a crucial sequence of subsequent events. Defining a set of improved settings eliminated the cause of such failure events.




Figure 4: Secondary equipment configuration

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Energy Management Division
Freyeslebenstrasse 1
91058 Erlangen, Germany

For more information, please contact
power-technologies.energy@siemens.com

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